This paper provides a conceptual model that [(A -raA ± pd dt)derd links agricultural profits, property taxes, interest [ a(AP A pd(d) rates, and capital gains to the sale of agricultural land by profit-maximizing owners. The model mo-subject to a constraint that describes the flow of tivates an empirical analysis of New Jersey data land from agriculture, from 1949 to 1990. Results suggest that nonagricultural considerations may overpower the eco-A = d,. nomic incentives provided by such policies as farmland assessment. Consequently, alternative It is possible that institutional or other considerpolicies (e.g., purchase of development rights and ations (e.g., zoning) may limit the amount of land land use zoning) may be needed to sustain agricul-that can be sold by the owner in any one period. ture in rapidly urbanizing areas.
The owner can acknowledge these by allowing The next section presents the conceptual model and derives hypotheses for key economic vari-0 < d, -da,, . ables. This section is followed by a description of . the data and econometric methods. After a discusOptmum land use decisions for the owner can now be identified using the Hamiltonian sion of results, the paper concludes with a summary and policy recommendations.
)
where X' represents the value to the owner of an Conceptual Framework additional acre of agricultural land (i.e., the costate variable). The owner's optimum sales of land, d*, can be determined from aH/ld, and the MaxiLand allocation decisions depend on the ability of mum Principle (Chiang 1992, 167-71) 4 For simplican at the maxim ity, let ,a(-) and pd(d t ) be net of income and other profits by selling land at the maximum rate (dma) taxes except for agricultural property taxes and let whenever the margal benefit from selling land .a represent the property taxes paid per acre of P + pdd , exceeds the marginal opportunity cost agricultural land. In addition, let pd(dt) be net of of removing the land from agculture, . When transactions costs (e.g., realtor's commissions).
marginal benefits fail to exceed marginal opportuTo maximize the wealth derived from the land nity costs, the land should be maintained in agriasset, the owner determines how much land, if culture (i.e., converting at the minimum rate, dt = 0). Between these two extremes, the owner will any, to offer for sale. The owner's optimum deci-= 0)-Between these two extremes, the owner will sion is to choose d, in order to maximize the maximize profits by converting at the singular rate present value of discounted profits (including land d, when the proceeds from selling land are just sales), equal to the value of land in agriculture. The value to the owner of land in agriculture deserves more attention. The value of land in agriculture derives from its 4 The model described in this section maintains the assumption that ability to provide profits. This can be seen from the lands most suited for agriculture are employed first, followed by lower owner's requirement for the evolution of Xa over quality lands. (2).
7 area, A t , for each year includes area devoted to The owner's optimum responses to changes in field crops, vegetables, fruits, and livestock. Net economic conditions can be obtained from the revenue for each year, Tr(.), is the sum of revenue comparative statics of the implicit function pd + derived from field crops, vegetables, fruits, and pd' -X" = 0. For example, after substituting for livestock, minus the costs of labor, capital, inter-X a using equation (5), the owner's optimum con-mediate, and energy inputs. Property taxes specifversion rate d* will change in response to exoge-ically are not deducted from this net revenue figure nous changes in (per acre) profits or taxes accord-(see "Conceptual Framework," above). Marginal ing to net revenue per acre, TrA, is approximated using the annual change in the market value of agriculdi pd + p tural land. The average value of agricultural real Thus, the owner will maximize profits by decreas-estate includes the value of buildings and improveing conversion when marginal profits increase and ments. For the period over which New Jersey data by increasing conversion when property taxes in-are available, land value is roughly 20% of total crease. The next section investigates whether these property value. The observation for X' used in the responses are consistent with New Jersey data.
following analysis is calculated as (X' -XAi)/ t_ l i, where X t is 20% of the average price of agricultural real estate in New Jersey in year t.
7 An alternative solution technique is to highlight the economics of the optimal path (cf. optimal extraction, Hotelling). Define pd + pd' d as the marginal revenue from land sales, MR. For a singular solution, equation (2) requires that along the optimal path, (MR + Oa7TlaA -T)MR = r, i.e., the owner should sell land so that the rate of growth in marginal Agricultural land value (i.e., X,) for the deterministic problem does revenue, plus the net quasi-rents provided by agricultural land use (also not depend on capital gains (equation [5] ), although these may accrue expressed as a rate), is just equal to the opportunity cost of capital.
when land rents or taxes change. A model including stochastic rents or 8 The derivatives ofpd + pd" -Xa = 0 with respect to the variables taxes is needed before unanticipated capital gains would appear in the of interest (see below) are continuous. We maintain that these exist and solution to the differential equation for X,. The authors thank an anonare nonzero in the neighborhood of d* and the prevailing economic ymous reviewer for making this observation. conditions. Consequently, the requirements of the implicit function the-'" The New Jersey State Econometric Model of Agriculture orem are met (Chiang 1974, 216-22) and derivatives may be obtained (NJSEMA) groups thirty-five farm commodities into four categories: from the differentials of pd + pa' -Xa = 0. (To conserve space, field crops, vegetables, fruits, and livestock. Variable inputs are also subscripts will be used to denote partial derivatives and suppress argudivided into four categories: land, labor, capital, and intermediate inputs ments, so that aTa()l/aA, = Tir.) (e.g., feed, chemicals, and seed), and energy inputs.
Real land values are obtained by deflating nominal 
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the amount of land in agriculture, as the comparEquation (6) shows that 3k measures the percent-. . ative statics of the owner's problem would sugage change in land area attributable to a 1% change ge st. The impact ofne cultural revenue is also gest. The impact of net agricultural revenue is also in xk. Consequently, the relative magnitudes of in Consequently, the reconsistent with the conceptual model, but the es-3 k for different variables are directly comparable, timated coefficient cannot be dstngushed from are independent of the units used to measure the d h r are independent of the units used to measure the zero at the usual levels of significance. The influeconomic variables, x k and yield information economic variables,
, and yield information ence of capital gains may be more consistent with about the relative impact of changes in economic speculation than with the value of land in agriculvariables on agricultural land area.
variables on asgricultural land area. time-setural use. Each of these results will be discussed in Derived as they are from time-series observa-more detail below. tions, the errors u, are likely to exhibit autocorrelation. In the estimates that follow, we maintain Nt Farm Income the assumption that u, = pu t ,_ + vt, where the v t have zero mean and constant variance over time. The relative unimportance of net farm income may Estimated Generalized Least Squares methods are be attributable to abundant nonfarm employment employed to make use of this information (Judge et opportunities in nearby urban areas. For example, al., and to obtain efficient estimates of 3. New Jersey farmers in 1990 earned 36% more in off-farm income than in net farm income (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1991). Apparently, Results only a relatively small share of their net income is linked to the success of their farm operations. In After correcting for autocorrelation, the model fits addition, farmland in urbanizing areas may be the data well (adjusted R 2 = 0.86; see table 1). idled prior to its sale for development (i.e., the Because the hypothesis that p = 0 cannot be con-"impermanence syndrome" [Lockeretz 1989]) . clusively rejected using a bounds test (d = 1.468 Lopez, Adelaja, and Andrews find related evifalls between the upper and lower bounds for this dence that supply elasticity decreases with subursample size and specification), some autocorrela-banization. High demand for farmland and intion may persist in the model shown in table 1. creased opportunities for land sales may lead New Jersey farmers to become less responsive to agri-stream of annual services discounted at the same cultural market signals.
rate of time preference (e.g., residential services).
. While it is difficult to quantify how many owners This is in striking contrast to recent findings by of New Jersey farmland are speculators, it is worth Lopez, Shah, and Altobello (table 1) , who estinoting that only 46% of New Jersey farmers listed mate a Northeast regional elasticity of -1.065. farming as their principal occupation (U.S. De-The difference in response to property tax rates partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census suggests that there are potentially large differences 1989, 1987 Census of Agriculture, Part 30, New among states in the Northeast. As a result, policies Jersey). The negative elasticity for capital gains may need to be tailored to specific circumstances. may represent demand for agricultural land by The design of policies will be considered in the speculators, rather than owners wishing to con-next section. tinue agricultural use.
Interest Rates
Summary, Conclusions, and Increases in interest rates are associated with de-Policy Implications creases in agricultural land area (f 3 r = -0.136; see table 1). This result is consistent with profit-This paper provides a conceptual model that links maximizing land sale decisions and the interpreta-agricultural profits, property taxes, interest rates, tion of agricultural and as an asset capable of pro-and capital gains to the sale of agricultural land by viding income in the form of quasi-rents, Ta(). profit-maximizing owners. Overall, an econometEquation (5) suggests that as interest rates in-ric specification based on the model fits New Jercrease, the discounted net value of future agricul-sey data well. Higher interest rates, property taxes tural use decreases, leading the owner to favor sell-and speculative capital gains increase conversion ing the land (equation [2] ). It should be noted that of agricultural land. Land area is generally inelasp, the price offered for land, may also comprise a tic with respect to changes in economic conditions.
Further empirical work could reveal that assessment may perform differently for land use catego-" State-level land prices are formed in part by aggregate decision ries within agricultural use (e.g., field crops, vegrules similar to equation (2) for all potential land sellers. However, the etables, fruits, and livestock), and for specific lomarket clearing price and quantity of land depend also on land buyers . tute higher-valued crops for grain and livestock
